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This paper examines the social economic value of the Greenland off-shore 
shrimp fishery. The contribution of the fishery to the economy is examined us-
ing a cost-benefit analysis where the objective of the report is to examine the 
current state of the fishery rather than possible changes, which are a political 
decision.  
 
The analysis is undertaken by examining the state and development of the off-
shore shrimp fishery in Greenland, as well as the changes in profits, sales and 
production in the years 2006 and 2007. Financial accounts and costs data pro-
vided by the companies fishing in Greenland have contributed to estimating the 
net value of the industry. The management cost is included as well in the analy-
sis. 
 
The paper concludes that there is a positive economic benefit from the shrimp 
fishery in Greenland, which is believed to be caused by the efficient manage-
ment system of the fishery (based on Individual Transferable Quotas). It is fur-
ther shown that the companies and the crew gains nearly the whole net-benefit 
from the fishery, while the public finance are not gaining much. 
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1.  Introduction 
Shrimp fishery is an important industry for Greenland as most of its exports are 
fish and shrimp products. Various developments in the industry have been ob-
served in the last two decades. These include the introduction of Individual 
Transferable Quotas (ITQs), the reduction in the fishing fleet and the emerging 
of a few main companies that deal with shrimp fishing. Moreover, decreasing 
shrimp prices internationally have influenced the development of the industry. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse and assess the economic contribution of the 
offshore Greenlandic shrimp fishery to the economic welfare of Greenland. In 
order to determine the economic value of the industry a cost-benefit approach is 
applied. The aim is not to assess the economic impacts, i.e. the economic activ-
ity generated by the fishery, but the economic net benefit or rent of the fishery. 
The surplus of output over input value is a measure of the net benefit (economic 
rent or added value) generated by using inputs or resources (labour, capital, 
biomass, oil, etc.) to produce shrimp products. Positive added value
1 is a gain to 
the economy as a whole: Production generates outputs that are more valuable 
than the resources used in creating it. Another objective is to show the distribu-
tion of the total added value between the different economic agents in 
Greenland. 
 
This analysis is based on information from the accounts of the offshore shrimp-
fishing companies about their activities in Greenland, which has been acquired 
with a questionnaire sent to the companies. This questionnaire can be acquired 
by contacting the authors. The companies that have been included in this analy-
sis are Ice Trawl A/S, Niisa Trawl A/S, Polar Seafood Trawl A/S, Qajaq Trawl 
A/S and Royal Greenland A/S. From Greenland Statistics we have received 
yearly accounts, allocated quotas and catches of each firm. 
                                                            
1   Another concept is value added, which is calculated as the value of outputs minus the expenses to ma-
terials. Value added does not reflect that the use of capital and labour has an (opportunity) cost, and 
hence it can be considered as a measure of the economic impacts of the production. 6 
 
This paper includes three main parts – a methodology part discussing the cost-
benefit approach used (section 2), an introduction to the fishery and the man-
agement system presenting the main characteristics of the Greenlandic shrimp 
fishery (section 3), and a result and discussion part (section 4 and 5). The paper 
ends with the conclusion, which summarises the main findings of this analysis. 
2.  Methodology 
The purpose of the following chapter is to explain the necessary methodology 
in order to be able to perform the analysis. The first step is to define the overall 
constraints of the final analysis, meaning which steps of the product life cycle 
will should be included. Due to the aim of this report, the authors have set the 
constraints from sea to sales of the shrimp product out of Greenland. Sea in this 
context is defined as all activities necessary in order to fish the shrimps limited 
to Greenland as the fishing area, whereas sales refers to the delivery of the 
product to the sales companies, which can also be situated in other countries. 
Subsequent steps will therefore be disregarded. 
 
The second necessary step is to acquire information concerning the production 
and cost and earnings of each vessel. This was obtained by asking the compa-
nies to complete a spreadsheet about all costs, operating profit and investments 
for each vessel in each target year, as well as the type of product specified in 
shrimp size category, unit size of shrimp packs, quantity of catch and finally the 
price. All data focus on the shrimp fishing and production for the target years 
2006 and 2007. This information is supplemented with the annual accounts and 
data on yearly quotas and catches from Greenland Statistics.  
 
Subsequently a cost-benefit analysis approach is used in order to analyse each 
vessel separately and the total costs and benefits generated by the industry. 7 
 
2.1.  A short introduction to cost-benefit analysis 
There are several reasons why cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a useful economic 
policy evaluation tool, see Arrow et al. (1996). CBA is the most comprehensive 
one.
2 Economic evaluation tries to assess the social desirability of a regulation 
compared to a given baseline situation or some other alternative but can also be 
used as an approach to determine the actual state of a given situation. Therefore 
economic evaluation can help public policy in focusing on the need for regula-
tion and to find the scope and design of the regulation, e.g. by showing that a 
current regulation is not least-cost efficient. In cost-benefit analysis the impacts 
in terms of benefits and costs are systematically determined and compared by 
transforming the impacts to monetary units.
3 CBA has also been applied to 
evaluate fishery policy by Freese, Glock og Squires (1995), Herrick et al. 
(1994) and Schwindt et al. (2000). Brown and Macfadyen (2007) apply a cost-
benefit analysis to evaluated management responses to “ghost fishing”. 
 
The basic foundation in CBA is a financial statement of the (changes in) the 
flow of income and cost that the (new) regulation cause for the consumers and 
producers, i.e. the consumer and producer surplus
4 are determined. As part of 
the CBA, the single producer’s income and cost can be determined making it 
possible to set up an individual profit balance. This is important information, 
because changes in profit influence the producer’s incentives and hence reac-
tion to policy changes. Considering these aspects and due to the focus on in-
curred costs and gained benefits by a society from a certain resource use makes 
cost-benefit analysis an economic rather than a financial analysis. Therefore, 
                                                            
2   Another method is cost-effectiveness where the ratio between impacts measured in physical terms 
and the monetary cost are compared of different alternatives. In this case the benefits are not assessed 
in monetary terms. 
3   It is not possible to ”put money on all impacts”. However, a complete cost-benefit report will contain 
a description of the non-monetary impacts.  
4   Consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the price consumers are willing to pay for a 
certain product and the price they actually pay; producer surplus expresses the difference between the 
price that producers are willing to supply a market and the price they actually receive. 8 
 
the financial statement has to be corrected, so the statement is seen from a so-
cial point of view. Certain payments that occur in a financial analysis do not re-
flect a transfer of resources from one member of society to another and are ir-
relevant from the perspective of society as a whole and are therefore not con-
sidered in cost-benefit analysis. Neglected transfer payments include direct 
taxes, interest payments as well as depreciation, whereas subsidies, for exam-
ple, need to be included since they represent a real resource cost to the society. 
Furthermore, it is important for a CBA to consider the following: 
 
  whether market prices can be applied directly or a shadow price has to be 
calculated (more about this aspect latter),  
  the extent of externalities (in fisheries there are normally significant nega-
tive externalities), and 
  the mentioned flow of transfers which in a private analysis count, but not 
in social analysis. 
 
Finally, also cost from changes in management can be important to include. 
Since these costs normally are not included, the implicit assumption is that the 
changes in management cost are zero. This might be a reasonable assumption, 
when small changes in management are analyzed. Since we are assessing the 
actual economic state of the fishery, the current management cost is included. 
 
The time perspective is a crucial issue in CBA, because often the cost will be 
high in the short term due to initial investment cost, while the benefits tend to 
be higher in the medium to longer term. Therefore, in order to be able to com-
pare the changes in benefits and costs they are discounted back to the present 
period, given present values. The weighting of these flows at different time pe-
riods is possible by using the price of holding money, the discount rate. The 
choice of discount rate is important and has to reflect the weight the society put 
on the future. It is more or less accepted that a private agent tends to discount 
the future too much and hence the social discount rate is smaller than the mar-
ket money rate. However, the choice of the appropriate interest rate to use for 9 
 
the discounting is a widely discussed topic (see e.g. Weitzman 2001). We will 
not consider this further in the paper. Nevertheless, the applied discount rate 
will be stated and briefly argued in the analysis section 4. 
 
The goal of economic organization is to maximize the net benefit or added 
value emanating from the production of goods and services over time. The 
overall economic net-benefits to the society of the fishery are therefore deter-
mined as follows: 
 
Net-benefits to society = NPV (benefits – costs + external benefits – external costs)  (1) 
 
where NPV is the net present value of the elements in the brackets since timing 
of costs and benefits matters. If the net-benefits (or NPV) to society are positive 
then the regulation or the actual state of a situation contributes to the economic 
welfare, which means that the overall possibilities for consumption are in-
creased. However, the analysis concerning the distributional issues as who will 
experience a gain and who will experience a loss is in this perspective not rele-
vant, only that potential gainers could compensate the potential losers such that 
both would be better off (Pareto efficient). It is not the case that the compensa-
tion actually happens; merely that it is possible (potential Pareto improvement). 
However, in practice distributional issues and consequences are important and 
normally included in the cost-benefit analysis. In this part the financial flows 
becomes important. 
3.  State and development of Greenlandic shrimp fishery 
The North Atlantic Ocean is abundant in northern shrimps (Pandalus Borealis), 
which are the primary shellfish there. In Greenland, shrimps have been har-
vested for more than 100 years, while since the 1960s the greatest increase in 
commercial shrimp-fishing has been observed (Hvingel 2006). Greenlandic 
shrimps are considered of high quality and have high retail value. In 2005, the 
European Union imported more shrimps from Greenland than from any other 10 
 
country (European Commission 2007a). Nowadays approximately 85% from 
the Greenlandic exports are fish products, from which 55% are shrimps (Statis-
tics Greenland 2007). 
3.1.  The shrimp fishing regulations: Individual Transferable Quotas 
(ITQs) and Total Allowable Catch (TAC)  
Shrimp fishing is regulated by quotas and licence regulations, where the Total 
Allowable Catch (TAC) is based on the biological advice by the North Atlantic 
Fishing Organisation in order to ensure sustainable use of the resource. The 
TAC for shrimps has increased from 50,000 tons in 1990 to over 130,000 tons 
in 2007 and it is assessed that currently the amount of harvested shrimps is at 
the Maximum Sustainable Yield (Hvingel 2006; Sermitsiaq 2007). 
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) 
In general, fisheries can be organised by many different property rights ar-
rangements, whereas sole ownerships, territorial use rights, individual non-
transferable quotas and individual transferable quotas are some of the most used 
arrangements nowadays. Individual quotas basically define property rights in 
harvesting volume. Referring to the literature these property rights are of high 
quality, when being permanent, exclusive, secure and transferable. Therefore, it 
is argued that if other market imperfections are disregarded, harvesting with the 
usage of individual quotas will be conducted in an economically efficient way. 
This in return implies that the total allowable catch will be taken at minimum 
cost (Arnason 2005). Greenland’s individual transferable quota system for off-
shore and coastal shrimp fisheries has been introduced by the Ministry of Fish-
eries and Hunting in 1990 and 1997 respectively. It is stated that this system 
sufficiently regulates fishing capacity according to the available resources and 
assures that quota owners do not have any economic incentives to invest more 
than their respective quota share can support (OECD 2005). The Greenland 
Home Rule determines the TAC each year and may renew the allocation of the 
individual shrimp quotas every five years. The TAC is usually determined in 11 
 
accordance with the advice from international research institutions such as 
ICES (International Council for the Exploration of the Sea) and NAFO (North 
Atlantic Fisheries Organization).  
 
The Greenland Fisheries License Control (GFLK) is in charge of the control 
and compliance with quota and license regulations and is also responsible for 
monitoring Greenlandic vessels fishing outside Greenlandic waters. In average 
about 50 fisheries license controllers are employed at the GFLK. Furthermore, 
two inspectors are installed onboard on all high sea vessels in Greenlandic wa-
ters and a satellite system has been installed in order to control the operations 
and monitor all trawler movements and activities in Greenlandic waters respec-
tively. 
TACs and Greenland quotas 
Table 1 depicts the Greenlandic fishing quotas for the year 2000 till 2008. The 
most important result analysing the data is that the fishing quota for shrimp has 
increased considerably during the last decade. In 2000 the total quota was 
104.000 tons, while in 2003 it increased to 129,000 tons and in 2007 to about 
135.000 tons (OECD 2005; Departementet for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug   
2007). In comparison, the shrimp quota was only 47,900 tons
5 in 1997 (Anon 
1998). Being more specific for the year 2006 and 2007 it can be stated that 
about 41% of the quotas have been issued for inshore shrimp fishing, whereas 
the other 59% for offshore fishing and are allocated in the following way: 5% to 
the East coast and 54% to the West coast of Greenland in 2006 and 4% and 
55% in 2007 respectively. Furthermore, it is important to mention that most 
shrimp fishing is undertaken by Greenlandic companies where the European 
Union has an agreement of up to 11,000 tons per year for the period 2007-2012 
(European Commission 2007b). 
 
                                                            
5   However, the figures can’t be compared directly. The figure for 1997 has to be adjusted by a conver-
sion factor, so the adjusted TAC is close to 70,000 ton. 12 
 
Table 1. Total Greenland fishing quotas for shrimp for Greenland fleet 2000-
2008. Thousand tons 






































104.0 119.0  118.2 129.0 136.7 136.7 136.7 135.4 128.7
Source: Anon 2008. 
3.2.  The off-shore shrimp industry 
The shrimp-fishing industry is highly specialised as it involves long-term in-
vestments in large shrimp-harvesting vessels that can process the shrimps on-
board. These trawlers are usually allowed to process up to 75% of their catch 
onboard (FAO 2008). The last 25% of the catch has to be landed to on-shore 
production facilities where the shrimps are processed to an un-peeled product. 
Smaller vessels have reduced in number due to the restructuring of shrimp fish-
ing industry and the introduction of Individual Transferable Quotas. Today 
small vessels harvest only inshore (Hvingel 2006). Currently, there are five-six 
main companies who harvest shrimp offshore and which altogether possess ap-
proximately 10-11 vessels,
6 see Table 2. 
 
                                                            
6   During 2006 and 2007 there have been some mergers between companies, which make it difficult to 
state the exact amount of firms and vessels. 13 
 
Table 2. Number of vessels in the off-shore shrimp fishery in the period 
1990-2007 
Year 1990  2003  2006  2007 
Number of vessels  46  12  11  11 
Source: Anon 2006a and catch reports from GFLK. 
Production and price development 
Offshore shrimp catch in 2007 was 71,800 tons, which was a 1.7 % increase 
from the year before (Departement for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug   2007). 
Landings to on-shore shrimp processing facilities have increased from ap-
proximately 24,000 tons in 1987 to 60,000 tons in 2006 (see following figure), 
whereas about 45,000 tons is from the inshore fishery.
7 
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Landings
 
Source: Statistics Greenland. 
 
Shrimp production is divided in two main categories – frozen, peeled shrimps 
and frozen, unpeeled shrimps. The variations in production and export of each 
type can be seen in the following figure. 
                                                            
7   As the vessels are smaller in the inshore fishery most of them is landing all their catches to the on-
shore production facilities. 14 
 
















Source: Statistics Greenland. 
 
Furthermore, shrimp prices changes for each production type are shown in Fig-
ure 3. Shrimp prices have changed in a non-uniform way. Especially the frozen, 
unpeeled shrimps have reduced in value by a factor of 5 in the period 1996-
2006. This decrease has been triggered most likely by the increased world mar-
ket supply of warm-water shrimps, mostly from Asian countries (Departementet 
for Fiskeri, Fangst og Landbrug 2008).
8 
 
                                                            
8   The jump in prices for peeled shrimp in 1998 is due to change in the principle of transfer prices (pers. 
comm. 2009). 15 
 



















Source: Statistics Greenland. 
Employment 
Fishing (including processing) is the primary industry in Greenland and em-
ploys 25% of the work force. The processing industry accounts for 40% of that 
share, whereas fishing accounts for the remaining 60% (OECD 2005). It has not 
been possible to get exact information about the employment numbers. How-
ever, in the official company accounts the average employment is disclosed to 
be around 31 per vessel. In the Anon (2006a) the employment per vessel is as-
sumed to be 40-50, while in Anon (2006b) the employment per vessel is as-
sumed to be around 40. The employment rate has an impact on the assessment 
of the net benefit from the fishery and the distribution of the net benefit be-
tween vessel owners, crew and the public sector. We will therefore apply sensi-
tivity analysis to the employment figure, assuming either an employment of 30 
or 40 persons per vessel. 
4.  Assessment of the benefits and cost 
One has to realise that the assessment of benefits and cost by estimating the 
value of the shrimp and the cost to harvest them has the limitation that it does 
not address the potential net benefit of the harvest if the fishery was better man-16 
 
aged, i.e. the benefits and cost is specific to the current regulatory system. 
However, the ITQ management of the fishery is assessed to be highly efficient 
(Anon. 2006a) and consequently, using the actual benefits and costs are as-
sumed not to be a serious limitation. 
 





(1 ) (1 )
tt t t t t
tt
tt





   (2) 
 
where benefit (B) is equal to the value of harvest (HV). Cost (C) is equal to pri-
vate cost (PC), Home Rule cost (HRC) and external cost (EC). All the benefits 
and cost are evaluated at their willingness to pay and opportunity cost, i.e. mar-
ket or observed prices are adjusted to reflect people’s willingness to pay or 
what they have to give up when using the factors in the shrimp fishery. In the 
following we will assume that the external cost of the fishery (EC) is equal to 
zero. We hereby ignore the value of other species that prey on shrimp (e.g. 
cod),
9 and the existence values associated with preservation of this resource. 
We also ignore the impact the fishery might have at other fish stocks through 
the catch of juveniles. 
 
In the following we determine the harvest value, the private cost and the man-
agement cost. 
4.1.  Total harvest and value of the harvest 
We assume that the gross benefits of the shrimp harvest in any given year are 
reflected in the landed value of the catch (producer surplus). This ignores po-
tential consumer surpluses. However, this is not a significant problem, because 
                                                            
9   Since the 1970s the cod stock in Greenland waters have been low and therefore this effect of the 
shrimp fishery is insignificant. This might change in the future due to climate changes, see 
Vilhjálmsson (2005). 17 
 
most production is exported, and we assume, as is the usual convention, that 
only those costs and benefits that accrue to Greenland count. Under these cir-
cumstances, consumer surpluses accruing to people from Greenland are very 
small and can therefore be safely omitted from the calculations. 
 
The answers from the 5 companies include 7 vessels in 2006 and 9 vessels in 
2007, which explains why the reported catches in Table 3 are lower than in Ta-
ble 1. The whole off-shore shrimp fishery in 2006 is therefore not covered. Also 
the information about production from the companies in Table 3 does not match 
the catch exactly, which might be due to the different timing of registration of 
catches and production and differences in the methods of determining catches 
and production (per. comm. 2009). 
 
Table 3. Harvest volume and harvest value 
 2006  2007 
Total License/Quotas (tons)*  55,305  70,675 
Total catch (tons)*  55,305  64,432 
Total harvest value (1000 kr.)**  562,970  679,470 
Total Production (tons)** 
     Cooked at Sea 
     Raw (“Italy” and “Japan”) 









Total Harvest value (1000 kr.)** 
     Cooked at Sea 
     Raw (“Italy” and “Japan”) 









Source:  *Catch reports from GFLK. **Information from the fishing firms in the questionnaire. 18 
 
4.2.  Private cost 
We are interested in both the private harvest cost and public sector costs. The 
primary source of information on the costs of operating the shrimp fleet is the 
data provided by the companies in their yearly accounts. It is reasonable to as-
sume that expenditures on inputs approximate the opportunity costs of the in-
puts. There is no reason to believe that industry purchases have a significant 
impact on input prices or that the markets for most inputs are distorted. Many of 
the inputs are imported and hence the price is determined by the world market 
prices. However, crew costs may be an exception. This issue will be investi-
gated in more detail in the next section. 
 
Operating expenses (fuel, other), crew wages and fixed annual costs (e.g. re-
pairs and gear) are included under “running costs”. To assess the capital cost, 
an estimate of the opportunity cost of capital investment annually is required in 
the framework we use here, which is not straightforward. The costs of invest-
ments should be converted into a value of the stream of consumption that would 
have resulted if the investments had not taken place. The opportunity cost or 
shadow price is the return the capital could have earned in its best alternative 
use. Estimating this shadow price includes an assessment of the gross rate of re-
turn applicable to this capital and the economic depreciation rate (Hulten, 
1990). The capital cost included in the annual accounts cannot be applied di-
rectly. First, the figures do not include the opportunity cost of the equity capital. 
Second, they use depreciation claimed for accounting purposes, not based on an 
economic rate. Third, they include cost for all capital employed in the industry. 
The first two issues do not need more clarification as they are common in CBA; 
the third issue is however not common and deserves some elaboration. 
 19 
 
Table 4. Cost in the shrimp industry. 1000 kr. 
   2006  2007 
Running costs  Operation expenses 
   Fuel 
   Landing, packages 















Capital costs    85,755  106,307 
Total private 
cost 
 487,283  595,970 
 
A significant portion of the capital employed represents the value of ITQ fish-
ing licenses which from the perspective of the fishermen is an asset. Needless to 
say, an ITQ license is a requirement for participation in the fishery. For those 
who purchased their licenses, the cost of the ITQ license is a significant part of 
their capital investment. From a social point of view, the value of the ITQ li-
cense should not be included in the capital stock used to harvest shrimp, as it is 
not a real resource that is used up in the process of catching shrimp.
10 
 
Therefore, to estimate annual capital costs, we have ignored the value of ITQs 
licenses and used only vessel values. Using the answer from the questionnaire, 
we assume that the useful life of a fishing vessel is 20 years. To determine the 
rate of return applicable to this capital, we use annual rates of return to capital 
employed at 7 %. The annuity, i.e. the annual capital cost is then calculated us-
ing the well-known formula: 
 
                                                            






n r I capital cost
r

   (3) 
 
where I is the investment, r is the discount rate and n is the time horizon of the 
investment. 
4.3.  The management cost: Greenland Home Rule
11 
In addition to the private costs incurred by fishermen, the Greenland Home 
Rule, who has the responsibility for the shrimp fishery, spends resources to 
manage the shrimp fishery. The government expenditures on the fishery will 
approximate the social cost. However, it is difficult to quantify the costs of 
managing the shrimp resource for a number of reasons. Several public agencies 
and hence budgets are involved, and it is difficult to accurately share these vari-
ous budgets and expenditures to the shrimp fishery. And while some costs are 
directly derivable from budgets, other costs are indirect and extremely difficult 
to accurately estimate. There are no species-specific management budgets of 
Greenland Home Rule. However, it is possible to estimate an order of magni-
tude with respect to expenditures by the Home rule government. The expendi-
tures in the fiscal years 2006 and 2007 are set out in Table 5. We include ex-
penditures on scientific research and advice, control of the fishery and fees for 
membership of international organizations. The Science research and advice 
program at the Greenland Institute of Natural Resources involves expenditures 
on the biological sciences (e.g. stock assessment required to set the total allow-
able catch). 
 
                                                            
11   In 2009 Greenland became more independent called the Greenland Self-Government. 21 
 
Table 5. Public management cost. 1000 kr. 
 2003  2006  2007 
Greenland Institute of Natural Re-
sources fisheries related activities 
Fishery- and License control 













Total 47,000  49,876  50,874 
Off-shore shrimp fishery    17,089  17,431 
Source:  Information is from Anon 2006a, where the figures from 2003 are found. Assuming an in-
crease at 2% per year gives the figures for 2006 and 2007. 
 
Table 6. Calculation of the off-shore shrimp fishery’s share of the total fish 
export. Mill.kr. 
Exports 2006 
Fish and fish products  2,038 
Total exports of shrimp  1,197 
Exports of frozen, unpeeled shrimp  533 
Exports of Cooked, peeled shrimp  664 
Off-shore shrimp fisheries share of fish exports
1) 0.3426 
It is assumed that 25% of the off-shore catches are produced as industry shrimp and the basis of dis-
tribution of total catches between the off-shore and in-shore fleet is 57%/43%. 
 
These calculations yield an estimate of fisheries-related expenditures in Green-
land. However, these expenditures relate to all fisheries, not just shrimp. In 
2006, the export value of frozen, unpeeled shrimp accounted for 26.2% of the 
total value of fish exports, see Table 6 for further details. This percent has to be 
adjusted upwards, because the off-shore shrimp fleet is landing shrimp for fur-
ther processing on shore as cooked and peeled shrimps (8.1%). Consequently, 
the share of the off-shore shrimp fishery of total fish exports is 34.3%.  Using 
this assumption that 34.3 percent of the Greenland Home Rule fisheries-related 
budget can be allocated to the shrimp fishery gives an estimate of Greenland 22 
 
Home Rule expenditures on the shrimp fishery in 2006. This estimation proce-
dure is also applied to the budget for year 2007. The results are set out in Table 
5. 
 
Needless to say, the estimates of government costs attributable to the shrimp fi-
shery are not precise and they may understate public expenditures on this fi-
shery. First, the estimates ignore the Greenland Home Rule expenses in the Di-
rectorate of Fishery, Hunting and Agriculture. Second, both the fishermen and 
other sectors use harbors. Parts of the harbor expenditures can be allocated to 
the fishery. There is no harbor fee in Greenland and hence the fishing fleets do 
not pay for using the harbors. Finally, the calculations ignore the marginal 
excess tax burden, that is, the costs of taxation to fund these government ex-
penditures. However, some revenues are capture from the shrimp tax. 
5.  Results of the Cost-Benefit Analysis  
As said before, we focus on analyzing the current economic value and hence 
economic contribution of Greenland’s off-shore shrimp fishery without compar-
ing this situation to possible changes in the net-benefits to society by applying 
for example a different fishery policy or a modified resource allocation of ITQs. 
This means in detail that all benefits and costs including public management 
cost are assessed annually and discounted to derive the net present value. Fur-
thermore, market prices have been replaced with calculated shadow prices if 
necessary. This has been the case for the crew cost. Finally, the distribution of 
the net-benefits is estimated as this is an important policy issue in Greenland. 
5.1.  Results: Annual net benefits and net present value 
The following section presents the numerical results of the analysis, which in-
cludes on the one hand side the private and Home Rule costs and on the other 
hand the production, including the products with the shrimp size categories, 23 
 
quantities and price per kilo resulting in estimates of the gross output (harvest 
value).  
 
One missing issue is an evaluation of whether the applied prices reflect oppor-
tunity cost. In section 4.2 it was indicated that crew cost might be a problem in 
that respect. Using the employment figures from the yearly accounts (around 31 
persons per vessel) the average yearly salary is estimated to be around 700,000 
kr. This figure is very high. Assessing the opportunity cost is however a diffi-
cult task. Some of the crew is probably very essential for the fishery and can’t 
be replaced. Therefore just assuming that the opportunity cost is the average in-
come in Greenland will not be correct. It was decided to use the average yearly 
income of people outside the municipalities, around 460,000 kr., as opportunity 
cost, because many of these people are highly specialised. This leads to a 
downward reduction of the labour cost by 1/3 or in other words the crew is re-
ceiving some of the net-benefit, i.e. a salary beyond what is needed to keep 
them employed. This is called crew rent. We will, however, calculate the rent 
with employment at 40 persons per vessel. 
 
The estimates in Table 7 show that the yearly net-benefit or economic rent from 
the fishery and hence contribution to the Greenland economy is considerable, 
around 19% of the total harvest value. It is important to understand that this 
economic rent is due to an efficient fishery management system. The same kind 
of management system is also in function in for example Iceland and New Zea-
land where it has shown the same positive economic results. Needless to say, 
the size of the economic rent will vary from year to year depending on the price 
and cost development and the amount of quota (TAC). 
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Table 7. Annual benefits, cost and net benefits generated by the off-shore 
shrimp fishery. 1000 kr. 
  2006 2007  Average 
Harvest value  562,970  679,470  621,220 
- Private cost  487,283  595,970   541,626 
= Private net benefits  75,688  83,500   79,594 
- Home Rule cost  17,089  17,431   17,260 
= Fishery net bene-
fits 
58,598 66,069    62,334 
+ Crew rent
1) 46,651  59,216    52,934 
Social net benefits  105,249  125,285   115,268 
1) Crew rent = The difference between the actual salary and the opportunity cost of labour. 
 
The yearly benefits and cost can be extrapolated forward over 20 years using a 
proper discount rate and the Net Present Value (NPV) using equation (2) can be 
calculated. Using different assumptions about the social discount rate (3%, 5% 
and 7%), the net present value of the average annual net benefits using a time 
horizon at 20 years varies between 1,221 Mill.kr. and 1,715 Mill.kr. 
5.2.  Distribution of Net benefits 
In this section the net benefits are distributed between fishing firms, the crew 
and the public section, i.e. the Home Rule Government and the municipalities. 
 
In order to be able to do this, the tax revenue has to be calculated. We use the 
information provided by the firms themselves in the questionnaire and the flat 
tax rate (42%) for Nuuk, the capital of Greenland. The tax revenue related to 
the net-benefit is the shrimp tax, the company tax and the tax of the crew rent, 
see Table 8. Given the tax revenue and the benefits and cost calculated in the 
last section, it is possible to calculate the distribution of the net benefit or the 
resource rent between the firms, the crew and the public sector, see Table 9. 25 
 
Table 8. Calculations of the tax revenue. 1000 kr. 
 2006  2007  Average 
Shrimp tax  289  379  334 
Company tax  1,310  5,055  3,183 
Tax of crew rents  19,594  24,871  22,232 
Total tax revenue of net benefits  21,193  30,306  25,749 
Source: questionnaire and own calculations. 
 
The payments of company taxes are low compared to what a calculated pay-
ment would give. The main explanation of this difference is the depreciation 
rules according to the law, where the vessels are depreciated over 10 years and 
where also depreciation on licenses is allowed. A calculation applying the de-
preciation rules confirms that the level of company taxes shown in Table 9 can 
be expected when the average life of the vessels are less than 10 years. If the 
average life is higher than 10 years, i.e. the vessels are fully amortized, then the 
company tax payment increases to a level of around 35-40 mill.kr. Another ex-
planation for the low company taxes may be that some companies have activi-
ties beside shrimp fishery that contribute much lesser to the earnings than the 
shrimp fishery (pers. comm. 2009). 
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Table 9. Distribution of the net benefits generated by the off-shore shrimp 
fishery. 1000 kr. 











Private surplus  74,089  78,066  76,077 
Crew 
Rents 







Crew surplus  27,057  34,345  30,702 













4,104 12,875  8,489 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
The analysis of the distribution of the economic rent shows that the private 
companies and the crew are capturing the main part, up to 90%, see Table 9. If 
the company taxes are calculated using the tax rules, the annual tax revenue in-
creases with 16 Mill.kr. The total net-benefit does not change but the public 
sector receives in this calculation a higher share of the rent, around 20%. Such 
levels of tax payments are however not currently realized and we will not use 
this calculation further.  
 
If the number of crew members is 40 instead of 30 then the average payment 
falls and hence the crew rent will fall (Table 7). The salary payment to the crew 
is now only adjusted by 16%. The overall annual net benefit falls (Table 7) and 
this will also change the distribution of net benefits in Table 9. The annual net 
benefit will fall to 87.7 mill.kr. The private companies will have the same sur-
plus, while the net benefits to the crew and to the public sector will fall (due to 27 
 
less tax revenue from crew rent). The annual surplus to the crew is 14.7 mill.kr., 
while the public sector in this case has an annual deficit of 3.1 mill.kr. 
5.3.  Discussion of results 
The economic rent or resource rent of the off-shore shrimp fishery is substantial 
and as explained due to the management system of Individual Transferable 
Quotas. The sensitivity analysis on the employment per vessel and the discount 
rate does not change this conclusion. The annual economic rent in 2006 and 
2007 on average varies between 87.7 mill.kr. and 115.3 mill.kr. Since economic 
rent is showing the surplus when all the inputs have been paid, it is in principle 
a political decision how to share the surplus. The Greenland Home Rule has al-
ready a shrimp tax which due to low prices
12 does not provide significant reve-
nue. So, the question is therefore can the revenue to the public sector be in-
creased and under which circumstances is it a good idea? In Anon (2006a) there 
is a discussion about letting the industry pay for the management cost.  
 
There are, however, limitations for the taxation. The economic rent can be di-
vided into scarcity and intra-marginal rent. The scarcity rent comes from the 
limitation of a natural resource, here shrimp, while the intra-marginal rent is 
due to differences in the producers cost, i.e. the fishermen have heterogeneous 
skills. The “high-liners” in a fishery may have lower unit production costs than 
on average and therefore they earn intra-marginal rent. It is difficult to capture 
this part of the economic rent. And it is a very difficult task to separate the in-
tra-marginal rent from the scarcity rent, because it will require a detailed study 
and estimation of the individual company’s production and cost relationship. 
The off-shore shrimp fleet is relatively homogenous and the products the same, 
so the intra-marginal rent can be assumed to be relatively low.  A second limita-
tion is how the scarcity rent is spent. It is possible to design a system where the 
                                                            
12   If the average sales price is lower than or equal to 13.00 kr. per kilo the shrimp tax is zero. The shrimp 
tax rate increases by 1% per 1 kr. increase in sales price. The basis of the shrimp tax is the sales 
prices. 28 
 
public sector collects a substantial part of the rent without impacting the incen-
tives of the companies, see Kooten and Bulte (2000). If the public sector is 
spending the money wisely then it might be as good as having the private com-
panies collecting the rent (assuming of course that the private companies are the 
best to find profitable investments). 
6.  Conclusion 
The economic benefit of the Greenland off-shore shrimp fishery is estimated for 
the years 2006 and 2007. The annual economic rent or surplus of the fishery is 
around 100 mill.kr. (19% of the harvest value) which is a result of the current 
and well-functioning ITQ management system of the fishery. So, the fishery 
contributes positively to the Greenland economy and significantly, because the 
Greenland Gross Domestic Product was 10.5 billion kr. i 2007. The analysis has 
been limited to benefits (and cost) from the fishery accruing in Greenland, i.e. 
the harvest value is given the prices ab. Greenland. 
 
The economic impact of the fishery is higher because it induces economic ac-
tivities in e.g. sectors that deliver inputs to the fleet. It is also important to real-
ise that it is easy to increase the economic impacts (f. ex. increase the number 
of vessels) of the fishery, but this is economically wasteful and will lead to 
lower growth in general of the Greenland economy. 
 
The collection of the rent or surplus is an open question which - from an eco-
nomic point of view - depends on how the private and public sector is behaving. 
A private fishing sector that is capitalizing the rents into the value of quotas 
ending up as consumption among those who got the quotas or a public sector 
that use the money for short run popularity are  arguments against having both 
of them to collect the rent. However, a private sector investing the rent profita-
bly or the public sector using the money either to productive investments, e.g. 
in education, or to replace other taxes, are arguments for having both of them 
collecting the rent. 29 
 
These economic arguments may overlook the political economic argument that 
the Greenland public opinion might not be willing to tolerate the distribution of 
income resulting from the way the quotas have been allocated, even if they un-
derstand the efficiency of the system. So, to maintain a wider acceptance of the 
system, it may probably be necessary to let the public sector collect a higher 
share of the economic rent. This acceptance is important, because an abandon-
ment of the fishery management system to a more wasteful one will have a 
negative impact on the economic growth in Greenland. 30 
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